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 Abstract 
 Th is article discusses the Turkish movie  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq (Kurtlar Vadisi–Irak), a 
blockbuster in Turkey in 2006. Th e movie has made an important mark on the history of Turkish 
popular culture, not through any artistic achievement, but because of the movie’s ‘reversed’ 
representations/imaginations. Th e movie contains favorable views of ‘Pax Turca’ and ‘Pax 
Islamica’ as well as a critique, which is quite anti-American, of the American occupation of Iraq. 
Th ese images and thus the movie itself give powerful insights into the geopolitical self/other 
representations of Turks in the current global (dis)order. In addition to these ‘reversed’ geopoli-
tical representations, the movie reverses (or to be more correct, ‘steals’) and uses one of the most 
important soft power tools that Westerners have: cinema and, hence, makes  Valley of the Wolves–
Iraq a case of double ‘anti-geopolitics’. 
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 Th e movie  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq ( Kurtlar Vadisi–Irak ) was not only the ‘hit’ 
movie of 2006 in Turkey, but it was credited with several fi rsts in the history 
of Turkish cinema: it was the most expensive Turkish movie ever made, one of 
the most-watched Turkish movie of all time, and because of its anti-American, 
anti-Western and anti-Semitic character, the only Turkish fi lm that further 
strained (the already strained) US-Turkish relations. In addition to all these, 
 Valley of the Wolves–Iraq will probably be remembered as the only Turkish 
movie, according to the Turkish newspaper  Hürriyet , that became the subject 
of a question at a hearing in the US Congress when, in March 2006, US 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was asked why moviegoers in Turkey, 
a supposedly ‘staunch’ US ally, had welcomed  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq ‘that 
portrayed the US soldiers as villains killing innocent people at a wedding in 
Iraq,’ and what the Bush administration was doing in order to win the ‘hearts 
and the minds of the Muslim world’ (Hürriyet  2006 ). 
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 Th e battle for ‘hearts and the minds’ was important in the past; today, it is 
considered as important as the battle itself. Winning ‘hearts and minds’ is 
important because it is considered the ‘key’ to ‘getting the outcomes wanted’ 
without ‘coercion,’ but rather by way of ‘attraction’ (Nye  2004 : x). And, it is 
no coincidence that  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq appeared on the silver screen 
immediately after various observers started to talk about American soft power 
reaching new lows, and anti-Americanism, not only in Turkey, but around the 
world reaching new highs (Kurlantzick  2005 ). 
 Th is article discusses the uproar – domestic and international – that  Valley 
of the Wolves–Iraq created. Th e movie is a spin-off  from a popular TV series of 
the same name (Kurtlar Vadisi), and details the adventures of a Rambo/Bond 
mix Turkish secret-service agent and his friends in American-invaded Iraq in 
their quest to take revenge for Turkish soldiers who were captured and humili-
ated by American soldiers. Th e uproar that the movie created, however, is due 
to the out-of-the ordinary geopolitical representations/imaginations of Turkey, 
Iraq, and the Middle East as well as the Americans. I argue that these repre-
sentations/imaginations in  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq are ‘reversed’ geopolitical 
representations or anti-geopolitics, to use the critical geopolitics language. 
Anti-geopolitics is the attempt of lesser powers to defy the world’s hegemon. 
Th is defi ance can take material and non-material forms: the lesser powers can 
come up with their own economic and military might as well as their own 
versions of representations of the world or both (Routledge  1998 : 245). 
 As I will elaborate shortly,  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq contains an idealized 
representation of Islam, Turkish presence in the Middle East and a very nega-
tive view of Americans and the United States. While the movie portrays Islam 
and Turkish presence in the Middle East as elements of peace and stability, the 
Americans are portrayed as religious zealots trying to bring their own version 
of ‘order’ to Babylon and thus destabilizing the supposed order in the Middle 
East. Given this framework, in a nutshell, the movie can be described as the 
clash of ‘Pax Turca’ along with ‘Pax Islamica’, against the American Empire. 
 As a movie,  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq does not achieve much in terms of 
artistry. But through its ‘reversed’ representations, it becomes one of the fi nest 
examples of anti-geopolitics producing representations running contrary to 
the predominant geopolitical representations coming out of Hollywood, 
which, most of the time, portray Americans as the ‘good guys’ and the rest of 
the world as the ‘bad guys.’ What is more, in  Valley of the Wolves – Iraq not only 
are the representations reversed, but there is the use of a soft power tool, i.e. 
cinema, as well. Th at is, on the screen,  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq shows that 
Turkish secret-service agents can beat the American ones and off  the screen, 
Turks can (at least try to) compete with the American monopoly of producing 
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representations of the world. Th e movie’s producers have expressed their sense 
of mission in this regard as well. Th e scriptwriter, Bahadır Özdener, for exam-
ple, said ‘perhaps 60% or 70% of what happens on screen is factually true. 
Turkey and America are allies, but Turkey wants to say something to its friend. 
We want to say the bitter truth. We want to say that this is wrong’ (Rainsford 
 2006 ). So, no matter how anti-American, anti-Western and anti-Semitic (and 
thus politically incorrect) by Western standards,  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq can 
be read as a Turkish popular geopolitical critique of the American readings of 
both the ‘reel’ and the real world. 
 Popular geopolitics is one of the most important tools used to understand 
perceptions regarding national and international images that exist and persist 
in society (Dittmer  2005 ; Edwardson 2003). As part of popular geopolitics, 
movies and their characters have an important role in the expression and 
reproduction of a nation’s or state’s position in the international order, through 
rewriting of the space and reevaluating global politics (O’Tuathail  2005 ; 
Dodds  2000 ; Dodds  2003 ; Power and Crampton  2005 ). And if critical geo-
politics is about the ‘competition’ to ‘impose order and meaning upon space,’ 
as O’Tuathail ( 1996 : 1) argues, then  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq has created the 
Turkish ‘impositions’ of representations over the current state of aff airs in the 
Middle East and Turkey’s place in this (dis)order. 
 Th e Movie, the Context, and the Responses 
 Th e Movie 
 ‘Th ose that think of their end cannot become a hero,’ says the  Valley of the 
Wolves–Iraq ’s tagline. Th e hero of the movie, Polat Alemdar, played by Necati 
Şaşmaz, who previously was also the hero of the TV series in Turkey, obviously 
not thinking about himself or his end, jumps from the TV screen to the silver 
screen with two of his friends, Memati Baş and Abdulhey Çoban, to fi nd him-
self in Northern Iraq. Th e ‘good guys’ mission is to take fi ctional revenge on a 
non-fi ctional incident – the hooded capturing of the Turkish Special Forces in 
Northern Iraq on July 4, 2003 by US troops. 1 From that point, the movie 
  1 Th ough the reason for this hooded capturing was never made public there were allegations 
suggesting that the Turks who were arrested were part of a conspiracy plan involving the assas-
sination of the mayor of Kirkuk. See for example, Michael Howard and Suzanne Goldenberg, 
‘US Arrest of Soldiers Infuriates Turkey,’  Th e Guardian , July 8, 2003. 
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turns into a cat-and-mouse game, in which Alemdar and his friends try to 
catch the ‘bad guy’ named Sam Marshall (played by Billy Zane), the American 
commander who is responsible for the capturing of the Turkish special forces, 
in  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq . 
 Th e character Sam Marshall is no ordinary American soldier. As his name 
indicates, he is the embodiment of the United States of America, i.e. Uncle 
Sam and the self-appointed marshal of the world (Erdoğan  2006 : 89) – two 
references embedded in one name, with a last name highlighting American 
unilateralism and hegemony. And, not surprisingly, just like the Bush admin-
istration, Sam Marshall believes that he is on a peacemaking mission in 
‘Babylon’ fulfi lling the orders of God. 
 Th e paths of these two characters cross after Marshall arrests, hoods, and 
thus humiliates Turkish soldiers, prompting Alemdar and his friends’ arrival in 
Iraq to settle the account. Th e ‘good guys’’ fi rst plan to fi nd, hood, and thus 
settle the account with Sam Marshall fails at the American hotel, the Grand 
Harilton, (the scriptwriters seemed to be inspired by the Hilton when it came 
to name selection), when Sam Marshall artfully uses school children as a 
trump card outdoing Alemdar and his friends. 
 After this failed attempt, the issue between Alemdar and Marshall is no 
longer a matter of settling scores, but turns into a deadly hunt. In the course 
of this chase, another avenger, Leyla, the unfortunate bride, joins Alemdar and 
his friends. Th e viewer learns in the opening scenes of the movie that Leyla’s 
husband-to-be, along with many of the guests, was killed by Sam Marshall’s 
troops, when Marshall’s troops raided their wedding party on the grounds that 
guests fi ring shots in celebration of the wedding (a tradition in the Middle 
East) were ‘terrorists.’ So, in addition to the Hood Incident, in Suleymaniah, 
the scriptwriters  were also (slightly) inspired by another real event: the July 
2002 bombing of a wedding celebration near Oruzgan, Afghanistan by US 
fi ghter jets. Th ough  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq ’s starting point is two real events, 
the Hood Incident and Wedding Bombing, the rest of the movie is also sprin-
kled with remakes of the scenes of violence from the war in Iraq that the 
world’s media has written about. Th ese scenes are shot in the style of a docu-
mentary so as to better mix fi ction with some doses of reality: torture in Abu 
Ghraib, extrajudicial killing of civilians, suicide bombers, American soldiers 
searching homes and brutally beating people, Turkomans and Arabs packing 
their things and leaving their homes and lands. 
 Th ere are ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’ in  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq , just like in 
any standard action movie. Th e ‘good guys’ are the Turks, the Turkomans and 
the Arabs of Northern Iraq. Th e ‘bad guys’ are the Americans, the Jews, evan-
gelical Christians, and the Kurds of Iraq, who are collaborating with the 
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  2 Th e 1978 movie was about an American who got caught while trying to smuggle hashish 
out of Turkey. It portrayed Turks as ‘villains’ mistreating foreigners in prison and, eventually, the 
movie came to be equated with anti-Turkishness. 
  3 In Turkey, within a month of its opening, approximately four million moviegoers saw  Valley of 
the Wolves–Iraq . ‘Kurtlar Vadisi Irak 1 Ayda Gora’nın Rekorunu Kırdı,’  Milliyet , March 7, 2006. 
Americans. Th e movie is like a typical American action movie from the 1970s 
and the 1980s. Th e main ‘good guy’ is a hybrid between Rambo and Bond; 
the characters are caricaturized and the plot is sketchy, but the stereotypes and 
representations are reversed. Of course, like most action movies, it ends, with 
the ‘good guys’ winning. Th ough, in the fi nal scene, one of the ‘good guys’, the 
unfortunate bride Leyla, is killed; nevertheless, in this last scene, Polat Alemdar 
thrusts Leyla’s family heirloom dagger into Sam Marshall’s chest and kills him. 
Hence, Alemdar gets revenge for Leyla, the Turkish soldiers (Cheviron  2006 ; 
Sağlam  2006 ; Coşkun  2006 ) and as some commentators have argued, also an 
unmentioned revenge: the revenge of the  Midnight Express 2 (Tugend  2006 ; 
Baran: 138). 
 Overall, the movie  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq becomes a revenge taking 
mechanism, in all realms, but more importantly, in the realm of creating 
‘reversed’ geopolitical representations. As one  Washington Post article quoting 
a Turkish moviegoer puts it, in the ‘popular culture wars,’  Valley of the Wolves–
Iraq is ‘a missile fi red from the Turkish side’ (Vick  2006 ). Coupled with the 
reversal of stereotypes and representations, the movie’s popularity, 3 on the 
other hand was regarded as ‘concrete’ evidence of rabid ‘anti-Americanism’ in 
Turkey (Geraghty  2006 ; Musa  2006 ; Birch  2006 ; Baran  2006 ; Rainsford 
 2006 ). A commentator of Turkish origin even expressed her ‘shock and dis-
gust’ with the portrayal of Americans as ‘pure evil,’ worrying that the ‘paranoid 
fears propagated’ would sooner or later become ‘government policy’ (Baran 
 2006 : 138). For some Turks, on the other hand, the movie was nothing but a 
ploy to soothe and depressurize anti-American sentiment in Turkey (Yaşın 
 2006 : 158). However, those who hastily jumped to the ‘anti-Americanism in 
Turkey’ conclusion failed to consider the context and reasons for the popular-
ity of the movie and paid scant attention to contextual factors. Reviewing 
these factors may show the reader why analyzing  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq as a 
case of anti-geopolitics is a noteworthy endeavor to pursue. 
 Th e Context 
 First of all,  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq is a sequel to the very popular TV series – 
Kurtlar Vadisi – that ran on Turkish television. In the TV series, the same 
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main character, Polat Alemdar, had infi ltrated the Turkish mafi a for the good 
of the country, causing the eventual collapse and the dissolution of it. Th e 
values of honor, duty, and love of country coming before anything else, as well 
as other nationalist symbols were widely used in the TV series (Gültekin  2006 ; 
Erol Işık  2006 ), creating a large group of fans in Turkey. By the time the movie 
was made, the character of Polat Alemdar had become an idol, and the movie 
further boosted this idolizing. In 2006, for example, when Turkish high 
schools kids were asked who their role model was, 19.4 per cent of the sur-
veyed answered Polat Alemdar (Vatan  2006 ). 
 Secondly, it is important to note that  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq , by and large, 
was a commercial enterprise with sponsors and an extensive marketing cam-
paign. Having spent 10 million dollars and touting it as the most expensive 
movie made in the history of Turkish cinema, the movie’s producers made sure 
that  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq would not be a box-offi  ce fl op. Th e sponsors of 
the movie, for instance, make themselves apparent in the very fi rst scenes of 
the movie: Hürriyet, a Turkish mainstream newspaper and Next Star, a satel-
lite dish company. Marketing tricks, on the other hand, included off ering a 
private screening to the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan before 
anyone else had seen the movie (Haber X  2006 ), inviting his wife and some 
other ministers to the gala of the movie, and ensuring that favorable reviews 
these people made were known to the public – a message that was successfully 
conveyed by the Turkish media (Hasan  2006 ). 
 Th irdly, the producers and marketers of  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq could not 
have chosen a better time, when the nationalistic sentiments were running 
high in Turkey and had just started resonating in the realm of popular culture. 
Nationalism has run high in Turkey at most times, but the latest wave of ‘ris-
ing nationalism’ of the past few years is attributed to two main issues: the 
reemergence of Kurdish nationalism along with the Kurdish separatist attacks, 
and Turkey’s rocky relationship with the European Union (EU). Th e Kurdish 
separatist group, the PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan) has found a safe haven 
in American occupied Northern Iraq, and the ruled and rulers in Turkey have 
come to blame the United States for the resurrection of Kurdish separatism in 
Turkey since the summer of 2004. In addition to Kurdish nationalism, Turkey’s 
rocky relationship with the EU has also contributed to this rising nationalism 
in Turkey. Th e fact that while Turkey has endeavored to become an EU mem-
ber for more than four decades, countries that only became independent after 
the end of the Cold War have since become EU members, has created resent-
ment among Turks. What is more, the EU’s demands for democratization, 
improvement of minority rights, etc. have come to be regarded as Western-
originating conspiracies to weaken and divide Turkey. All these developments 
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  4 Burak Turna and Orkun Uçar,  Metal Fırtına (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2004). Th is politi-
cal fi ction as its authors like to call it, used real names as well as some military information that 
according to the United States, only Turkish Ministry of Foreign Aff airs and the Army Chief of 
Staff  would have known. Turna and Uçar also wrote several other sequels to the fi rst  Metal 
Fırtına book. 
have created alienated masses in Turkey, which in turn have come to look for 
a way to deal with the problems that they believe have been created by the 
West. 
 Popular culture has been the venue not only for expressing and refl ecting 
alienated Turks’ anger, but also replenishing the tarnished national ego. In the 
past few years, semi-fi ctional novels have captured the best-seller lists in Turkey 
for months.  Şu Çılgın Türkler (Th ose Crazy Turks) and  Metal Fırtına (Metal 
Storm) and its sequels are cases in point.  Şu Çılgın Türkler depicts the gallantry 
of the Turks in the War of Liberation. Th e  Metal Storm , 4 on the other hand, 
published in 2004, tells the story of a Turkish-American war in 2007, in 
which, not surprisingly, Turkish troops defeat the American ones and thus foil 
American plans to invade Turkey. Th e storylines of these books, just like  Valley 
of the Wolves–Iraq , mix fi ction with fact and thus blur the lines between what 
is real and unreal. Moreover, these semi-fi ctional novels equate these wars with 
the present-day ‘struggle’ that Turks have with the West (Yanık 2008). Looking 
at  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq in this context, basing it on a real event such as the 
Hood Incident, and then scattering the movie with remakes of real events in 
documentary style, such as the torture in Abu Ghraib, brutality of the 
American forces, etc., the producers of the movie ably exploited the revenge, 
honor and love of country motif – the classic staples for war and action mov-
ies. In other words,  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq successfully managed to cash in 
on this supposed Western insult and nationalistic sentiments running wild in 
Turkish society. 
 Th e Responses 
 Th e responses to  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq were as interesting as the context 
from which the movie stemmed. As a blockbuster, in addition to Turkey, 
it received coverage in various countries, ranging from the United States 
to Germany and from Russia to Argentina. Th e fi rst interesting comment 
came from the producers of the movie. When faced with accusations of anti-
Americanism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Christianism, they replied that  Valley 
of the Wolves–Iraq ‘was neither an anti-American nor an anti-Semitic movie, 
but an anti-war movie’ (Bağrıaçık  2006 ). 
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 American offi  cials preferred not to discuss the movie, saying that it was 
‘fi ctitious’ (Schogol  2006 ). Nevertheless, they warned US soldiers stationed in 
countries where the movie was showing to stay away from movie theaters and 
to avoid discussing the movie with strangers (Murray  2006 ). One covert criti-
cism that was made public came from General James Jones who said ‘what is 
important is to separate truth from fi ction and to help people base their opin-
ions on truths and facts. What is important is not inciting feelings in a certain 
direction’ (Turkish Daily News  2006 ). However, American offi  cials expressed 
that they felt uneasy with the way Turkish elites embraced the movie. One 
American offi  cial, who wanted to remain anonymous, was quoted as saying 
‘can you imagine the First Lady or the head of the House of Representatives 
going to the gala performance of a fi lm that could incite anti-Turkish feeling 
among Americans?’ (Birch  2006 ). 
 American actors Billy Zane and Gary Busey got their share of bad press as 
well. Th ey were criticized for taking part ‘in the vilest propaganda for some 
Turkish lira’ (Geraghty  2006 ). Some conservative critics even suggested that 
these two actors should be boycotted for ‘defaming American soldiers, por-
traying [them as]. … evil, brutal, cold-hearted murderers’ (Schlussel  2006 ). 
Th ese critics were not only bothered by the level of anti-Americanism, but also 
with the anti-Semitism in the movie. Gary Busey’s Jewish doctor character, 
who was harvesting organs from Iraqi prisoners and shipping them abroad, 
was considered not only a sign of anti-Semitism, but also of ‘revival of the 
ancient blood libel against the Jews’ (Schlussel  2006 ; Tugend  2006 ). 
 Th e Turkish political elites, on the other hand, seemed quite sure that the 
movie would have no eff ect on Turkish-American relations. Th e Minister of 
Foreign Aff airs at the time, Abdullah Gül, said ‘the Americans and Europeans 
make movies of this sort. Compared to the movies made in the past few years 
in the United States, this movie is nothing’ (Zaman  2006 ). Turkish Ambassador 
to the United States, Nebi Şensoy, on the other hand, said that the movie was 
not a ‘problem’ between the United States and Turkey, but rather, was a ‘hic-
cup’ (Milliyet  2006 ). Yet  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq continued to irritate people 
in the United States even two years after its release. In March 2008, for exam-
ple, Turkish newspapers reported that one of Hillary Clinton’s election cam-
paign fundraisers was removed from her staff  on the grounds that he fi nanced 
the making of  Valley of the Wolves—Iraq (Internet Haber  2008 ). 
 In Germany, there were mixed reactions to the movie. Christian Social 
Union leader and Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber was extremely 
critical of  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq . He, along with the Jewish community in 
Germany, asked for the movie to be banned (Çalabakan  2006 ; Agence France 
Press  2006 ), but to no avail. Other German offi  cials did not feel the same way. 
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Silvana Koch-Mehrin, a member of the European Parliament, criticized the 
demand to the ban the movie (Çalabakan, Oruç and Çiftçi  2006 ). And, when 
one of the movie theater chains in Germany, despite the increased public 
demand to watch  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq , did not extend the movie’s show-
ing, the chain was applauded for ‘social responsibility’ (Germany – OSC 
Report  2006 ). 
 What is more, according to Turkish newspapers,  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq 
made headlines in countries where there is little or no Turkish population. Th e 
common theme in these news stories is that the Turks were presented as get-
ting even with Hollywood. One Argentinean newspaper mentioned the movie 
as ‘this time Rambo is Turkish, victims are Yankees’ (Çiftçi  2006 ). One of the 
TV channels in Russia sent a crew to interview Turks about the movie, and 
presented the movie in their news hour as ‘Turks’ answer to Hollywood’ (Turk 
Rus  2006 ), and, again in Russia, the movie was selected to compete in the 
International Muslim Cinema Festival (Başlamış, 2006). Even Hizb ut-Tahrir 
of Britain felt the need to comment on  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq , saying that 
the popularity of the movie showed that Turks wanted to revive the seat of the 
Caliphate and also fi nd hope in Islam (Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir  2006 ). It 
seems diffi  cult to understand how Hizb ut-Tahrir arrived at that conclusion, 
but the torrent of responses from various parties amplifi ed the attention that 
was given to the movie. But, it was the anti-geopolitical content about the 
Middle East, Turkey, and the Americans that unleashed these responses. 
 When  ‘Pax Turca’ and  ‘Pax Islamica’ Meet the American Empire 
 Campbell argues that a state’s identity is dependent on the ‘reproduction’ of 
‘representations’ of ‘border,’ ‘threat,’ and ‘danger.’ He believes that these ‘repro-
ductions’ can be achieved in contexts, what he calls the ‘cultural discourses of 
community,’ which can be thought of as free from state interference (Campbell 
2003: 57). Yet, since the outcome of the ‘reproduction of these representa-
tions’ is eventually related to the making of a state’s identity, no discourse, 
regardless of how free from state interference it is, can be thought of as dissoci-
ated from a state’s identity (ibid.). 
 Valley of the Wolves–Iraq neatly fi ts this description by Campbell and other 
students of critical geopolitics.  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq is a commercial and 
supposedly artistic enterprise. Yet deliberately or not it also produces represen-
tations of not only the Turkish state and history, but also of Middle Eastern 
geography and politics as well as representations of the United States of 
America. Starting from the fi rst scene of the movie, viewers are imbued with 
Downloaded from Brill.com12/15/2018 06:54:49PM
via Bilkent University
162 L.K. Yanık / Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 2 (2009) 153–170 
the Turkish version of these representations. Th e scene opens with a Turkish 
soldier, Süleyman, writing a letter – a suicide note, as viewers will understand 
in a few seconds – to a ‘Dear Brother.’ Th is ‘Dear Brother’ is none other than 
Polat Alemdar. Th e soldier’s story or the event that prompted him to write the 
letter to Alemdar, is told with fl ashbacks and is based on a real event: the 
hooded capturing of the Turkish special troops on July 4, 2003 in Suleymaniah, 
Northern Iraq. 
 ‘On July 4th, while we are in Suleymaniah serving the security of the region, 
these men who, just a couple of days ago, drunk our tea, who we fought 
together, raided us and pointed their guns at us,’ writes this Turkish soldier in 
his note to Alemdar. Th en the scene moves to another fl ashback, where the 
commander of the Turkish troops is reporting the American raid to his supe-
riors on the phone. Despite the repeated assurances of this Turkish commander 
that the attack is not against them, but against the ‘Turkish nation’ and that 
he and his men are ‘ready to die,’ these ‘unknown’ superiors on the phone 
insist that the Turkish special troops should not resist arrest. Eventually, with-
out fi ring a single shot, the Turks surrender to Sam Marshall’s troops. As they 
do so, Marshall attempts to touch the Turkish fl ag on the table, but one of the 
Turks in the room quickly snatches the fl ag and puts it in his pocket. At that 
moment, the viewer realizes that the person who picks up the fl ag is the very 
same soldier writing this note to his ‘Dear Brother.’ What the viewer is also 
shown is that the American commander Marshall is not just humiliating 
Turkish soldiers by arresting them, but also insulting the Turkish nation when 
he tries to touch the Turkish fl ag. Th en, as the members of the Turkish special 
troops are being arrested, Sam Marshall jokingly tells his troops to make sure 
that the Turkish soldiers are hooded so that Americans ‘do not toy with their 
honor.’ Th en the camera zooms back to the soldier writing fi nal lines of his 
suicide note. Before committing suicide, the soldier fi nishes up by saying: 
 SÜLEYMAN: For all this time that we were in Iraq, we asked ourselves: what 
business did we have here? Over time we realized that those who conquered these 
lands always tormented the people on it. Only our ancestors did not do this. And, 
that day we did not live up to the legacy of our ancestors. Th at day we could not 
die for justice, stop the torment, we could not die for our honor…. And now, I 
want this from you. How painful it is, isn’t it? 
 Th is opening scene of  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq provides a condensed ver-
sion of the series of representations that are to come in the movie. Honor, 
duty, and love of country – three amorphous feelings related to the good of a 
nation – dominate this very fi rst scene of the movie. Turks are shown as a 
nation of people sacrifi cing their own lives for those values. What is more, 
Turkish historical legacy, i.e. the Ottoman presence in Iraq (and to some extent 
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in the Middle East), which is quite controversial indeed, is also favorably pre-
sented. As a result of  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq ’s idealized representations of 
Turkish history, a Turkish soldier, who is about to commit suicide, can talk 
about the ‘justice,’ ‘stability,’ and ‘order’ that the Ottoman Empire brought to 
the region. Moreover, in the rest of the movie, the Iraqis are portrayed as being 
extremely welcoming to the Turks. For example, the movie contains scenes 
such as kids playing on the street yelling ‘Turkey,’ or an old man saying 
‘Mashallah’ when he hears that Polat Alemdar comes from Turkey. Such scenes 
not only portray Turkish presence and history in a positive way, but also make 
 ‘Pax Turca’ , i.e. stability and order provided by the Turkish Empire, one of the 
most important themes running through  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq . 
 Paradoxically, as much as there is glorifi cation of – and thus a tacit yearning 
for the ‘golden past’ – one can also read a critique of the ‘gloomy present’ in 
the movie, i.e. the current state of aff airs in Turkey (Erdoğan  2006 : 83) . 
Turkish characters never pronounce these criticisms, but the viewer is shown 
the unspoken version of them. Th e unknown superiors, who, on the phone, 
give the Turkish special troops in Suleymaniah the order to not resist, is one 
such example that can be read as a critique of the Turkish state. Because 
the state cannot do its job, Polat Alemdar and his friends are called on to save 
the honor of the nation and fi ll in for the state that looks unwilling or inca-
pable of doing so. 
 Th e in-service-for-the-good-of-the-nation theme is repeated in the scene at 
the Grand Harilton where Alemdar ‘invites’ Sam Marshall and his men to be 
hooded and their pictures to be taken by journalists. Alemdar tells Marshall, 
‘I am not a political party leader. Nor am I diplomat, or a statesman. As you 
just said, I am a Turk.’ By saying this, the Alemdar character shows that he, as 
a Turk, was there to hood Marshall because the state was absent and incapable 
of doing so. Th is is what Sharp calls ‘feminization of government’ (Sharp 
 1998 : 165). But, this time, what we are seeing is not the feminization of the 
government, but of the state. Th is scene in  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq portrays a 
state that is not ‘man’ enough to stand up against the American troops and 
save the ‘honor’ of the nation. 
 Although Polat Alemdar is there to save the honor of the nation, he still 
respects the state. So presenting the ‘gloomy present’ is done by the ‘bad guy’, 
Sam Marshall. Marshall is very critical of the state of aff airs in modern-day 
Turkey; he is specifi cally shown making fun of Turkey’s dependence on the 
United States:
 MARSHALL: Look Turk……you love to brag, you have your own rules and you 
have unchanging Iraq policies and red lines. You always say no one can do 
anything here. Let me tell you something: we screwed up your Iraq policy and 
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your red lines. I do not understand you. You are not mad at [us doing all] this but 
at these hoods. We sent you money; we even sent the waistbands for your 
underwear. Why can you not produce anything? You say ‘money’, we send it. Do 
you swindle each other, so that you can get more? You said ‘we want arms’, we sent 
them. You accepted to fi ght. And then asked for more money. How can you forget 
that you begged us to protect you from the Communists? I will tell you what 
drove you mad: we do not need you anymore. 
 Marshall’s comments are indeed a tongue-in-cheek summary of Turkish 
political history since the end of World War II: Turkey was a buff er state dur-
ing the Cold War, but now that Soviet threat is gone and Turkey is no longer 
geopolitically important – a nightmare scenario for Turkish policy makers 
(Yaşın: 165). On top of the loss of importance, the country is suff ering from 
corruption or as the ‘bad guy’ puts it, ‘Turks [are] swindling each other.’ 
 While the Turks are rosily portrayed in  Valley of Wolves–Iraq , Americans, on 
the other hand, are shown through a very critical lens. Th rough the persona of 
Sam Marshall, the Americans are portrayed as an extremely hypocritical ex-
ally betraying the Turks, by saying one thing and doing just the opposite, and 
working to divide Iraq so they can benefi t from its riches. Sam Marshall’s 
whistling tune is a case in point, indicative of this hypocrisy. In almost every 
scene of the movie, the Marshall character, who in reality has a hardcore divide 
and rule agenda, whistles or plays the  Ode to Joy (which also is the anthem of 
the European Union), the lyrics of which are about all people becoming 
brothers. 
 Additionally, several diff erent scenes highlight another theme that runs 
through the movie: the American intentions of benefi ting from Iraq’s riches. 
When Alemdar and his friends fi rst arrive at the Grand Harilton, Alemdar 
asks the hotel manager to fi nd Sam Marshall. When the hotel manager looks 
puzzled, pretending not to know Marshall’s whereabouts, Alemdar asks, ‘Are 
you not the one who pays his salary?’ After Alemdar’s question comes the 
punch line of the scene linking American expansionism/ hegemony/imperial-
ism to American capitalism: ‘Is not American capitalism boss of the American 
soldiers?’ Th is theme is reiterated when the Turkoman leader complains to 
Alemdar about the way the Americans divided up Iraq. Th e leader says, ‘[the 
Americans] gave the desert to Arabs, mountains to Kurds and kept oil for 
themselves and we do not have any place to go.’ 
 As stated above, the viewer is also reminded of American brutality in Iraq, 
such as the torture and torment at Abu Ghraib, with several diff erent scenes of 
American soldiers (men and women – a reference probably to Lynndie 
England, the infamous female torturer of Abu Ghraib prison) torturing the 
Iraqis inserted in the movie. Th e scenes’ documentary style tries to make the 
movie’s storyline appear more real. 
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 Again using the persona of Sam Marshall, Americans are portrayed as 
 fundamentalist Christians talking to God and believing that they are on a 
religious mission in Babylon, i.e. the Promised Land. Several scenes and dia-
logs are telling in this regard and it was partially dialogs by Marshall that 
prompted critics to label  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq as an anti-Christian movie: 
 MARSHALL: Th e diff erence is that you act with your feelings. I am here to 
provide peace. And, those who can make peace are God’s children. 
 ALEMDAR: I do not have a child like you. 
 MARSHALL (praying after barely surviving an assassination attempt): Why do 
not you want me near you? But I know my duties for you have not fi nished 
yet ….I will die in these lands, my blood will fl ow in these lands, until the 
promised moment, that is until your return, that is until the promised land is 
ours, my blood will fl ow and when the promised land is ours peace will arrive. 
And whoever makes peace will be God’s Child. 
 Th roughout history, religion has functioned as one of the most important 
drivers of geopolitical imaginations (Agnew  2006 : 185).  Valley of the Wolves–
Iraq becomes a venue where these geopolitical imaginations based on religion 
make their way, albeit in a very critical way. At the core of these lines is the 
critique of the Bush administration’s neoconservative foreign policy, especially 
its ‘democratization’ agenda, which, to some extent, draws from the teachings 
of the fundamentalist Christian right (Monten  2005 : 126-130). It is also a 
well-known fact that some of these fundamentalist Christian groups link 
Christ’s return to earth with the establishment of a Jewish state in Babylon 
(Zunes  2005 : 76). 
 While  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq portrays Christians as those who would 
go to war to make peace, Islam is portrayed as the religion of peace and perse-
verance. In other words, the viewer receives hints of  Pax Islamica . Islam’s mes-
sage is disseminated through another character, Şeyh (Sheikh) Abdulrahman 
Halis Kerkuki, played by Ghassan Messoud. Th e Sheikh character in the 
movie is respected by every ethnic group, showing and suggesting that Islam 
can be a key to transcend ethnicity and nation, and thus the problems of 
the region. Th is transcending nature of the Sheikh bothers Sam Marshall, 
because while the Marshall character is trying to apply the divide and rule 
principle, the Sheikh is portrayed as using the ‘pacify and unite’ nature of 
Islam – an image that runs contrary to the way Islam is presented in Western 
media outlets. As a result,  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq is scattered with scenes and 
dialogs indicative of this self-perceived  Pax Islamica message. For example, the 
movie contains a scene where the Sheikh tells a wounded Iraqi who wants to 
fi ght Americans to stay calm and accept his fate. He then dissuades Leyla, 
who wants to avenge her husband and relatives, from becoming a suicide 
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bomber, on the grounds that it ‘means giving up the hope that God will save 
you, and killing the innocents’ – thoughts which the Sheikh claims to be the 
‘sign of Satan.’ Following this in another scene, which is very reminiscent of 
the capture and decapitation of the journalist Daniel Pearl, the Sheikh saves an 
American journalist from decapitation by insurgents, telling them ‘by tor-
menting other people you are also becoming the servant of the tormentors. 
Are you going to do what the Prophet has not done?’ In addition to these 
scenes, elsewhere in the movie Muslims are shown praying peacefully and 
worshipping God – almost mirror images to those disseminated though 
Western media outlets after 9/11. 
 Finally, the way that Kurds and their link to the Turkish nation are por-
trayed in  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq is also noteworthy, as the movie divides 
the Kurdish people into two: ‘good Kurds’ and ‘bad Kurds’. Needless to say, 
the ‘bad Kurds’ are those who are collaborating with the Americans in Northern 
Iraq, expelling the Turkomans and Arabs from their villages and thus reengi-
neering the demography of the region. Th e viewer meets the ‘bad Kurd’ early 
in the movie when Alemdar and his friends fi rst cross into Northern Iraq: 
 ABDULHEY: I don’t see any red carpet. 
 POLAT: Don’t worry. We will soon see the red …. yellow,…. green. 
 Polat Alemdar and his friends do not see that traditional Kurdish tricolor 
(yellow, red, and green) but immediately after this conversation, are stopped 
by Peshmerga patrols at a road-side checkpoint, who ask the purpose of 
Alemdar’s and his friends’ visit. Alemdar says, ‘Trade,…… I trade human 
beings, I heard they are cheap here,’ referencing the Kurdish collaboration 
with the United States. Th e movie is then fi lled with scenes of bad Kurds help-
ing Marshall. 
 Th ere are ‘good Kurds’ too. Th e dialog between Alemdar’s two friends, 
Memati and Abdulhey, towards the end of the movie, just before the fi nal 
showdown between Marshall and Alemdar, highlights one such point:
 MEMATI: It is all because of the Kurds. 
 ABDULHEY: I am a Kurd too! 
 MEMATI: But you are diff erent. 
 ABDULHEY: Th at is how everything starts, brother. 
 So, here the viewer is informed that Kurds who work for the good of the 
Turkish state/nation, like Abdulhey, are the good ones and those who collabo-
rate with the enemy against the interests of the Turkish state/nation are 
the bad ones. Approaching interethnic relations in this Manichean way 
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 paradoxically challenges and reaffi  rms one of the most important and reiterat-
ing themes of Turkish cinema: the phenomenon of ‘deep nation.’ Robins and 
Aksoy ( 2000 ) argue that until the 1990s Turkish cinema was pressured to 
emphasize unity among Turks. Here  Valley of the Wolves– Iraq goes beyond this 
deep nation in an intriguing manner. While it recognizes the Kurdish exis-
tence through dialogs in Kurdish inserted in the movie, the presence of a 
Kurdish character like Abdulhey shows that this recognition is only condi-
tional,  meaning that tolerance towards ‘others’ is only possible as long as he/
she is working for ‘us.’ 
 Conclusion 
 Th e big fuss about  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq is long over. But  Valley of the Wolves 
continues as a TV series – again in a controversial manner. Alemdar Polat 
and his friends’ fi rst return to the TV screens was short lived. Th e sequel to 
 Valley of the Wolves–Iraq ,  Valley of the Wolves–Terror , which had a storyline 
based on Turkey’s ‘terror’ problem (read Kurdish separatism in southeastern 
Turkey), was shelved after one episode when the Turkish Radio-TV Higher 
Council (RTÜK) asked for the series to be suspended. Th e fans of the series 
were so angry that the head of the RTÜK received death threats causing him 
to ask for police protection (Sazak  2007 ). Rechristened  Valley of the Wolves–
Ambush, the series continued. Th e fans were pleased and so were the producers 
of the series, who continue to be inspired by the real-life events taking place in 
Turkey. 
 Amidst the controversy and criticism, the movie and the series have made 
an important mark (I do not mean achievement by any means) in the history 
of Turkish popular culture. As this article argues, watching and writing on 
 Valley of the Wolves–Iraq are worthwhile for several reasons. First, the movie is 
one of the interesting cases where cinema is used as a tool (maybe a weapon in 
this case) to reverse hegemonic geopolitical representations. Th is time it is the 
Turks who come up with representations of world events. Second,  Valley of the 
Wolves–Iraq is rich in terms of reversed geopolitical representations or put dif-
ferently, probably one of the best cases of anti-geopolitics. And because the 
movie was very popular, it can be argued that  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq refl ects 
or reaffi  rms the perceptions that Turks hold these days. Th ese geopolitical 
representations are related to the way Turks envision themselves, their coun-
try’s and other countries’ place in the new global (dis)order, the issues that 
they perceive as a threat or danger, their yearnings and longings. 
 Jeopolitik (geopolitics) is an important term for Turks and Turkey. School 
children from an early age learn that Turkey is a geopolitically important 
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country and that, as a result, its ‘internal and external enemies’ want to 
 destabilize Turkey. Turkey, in other words, suff ers from a ‘perennial insecurity 
complex’ (Aydın  2003 : 163), and this ‘insecurity complex’ was until recently 
generated and regenerated by the Turkish state. Starting in the 1940s, fi rst 
military and then civilian actors of statecraft picked up the term ‘geopolitics’ 
and formulated danger and threat perceptions of a nation and remained the 
sole authority to do so for many years (Bilgin  2007 ). In today’s Turkey, how-
ever, the state is no longer alone. In the past few years, with the developments 
in mass media, other alternatives have emerged to challenge, but in most cases 
support the state’s geopolitical representations.  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq is a 
case in point; it is technically created by forces outside the state, yet one can 
fi nd representations that mostly confi rm the offi  cial ones. 
 Among these representations in  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq , the most impor-
tant ones are the favorable representations of the Turkish past and Islam. In 
defi ance of hegemonic representations that for years projected the Turkish past 
and Islam from a very negative point of view,  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq pres-
ents, literally, a virtual  Pax Turca and  Pax Islamica , showing Turks, Ottoman 
heritage and Islam as sources of stability and order in the Middle East. While 
there is also some critique of modern-day Turkey, much of the movie is a cri-
tique of the American Empire and its presence in the Middle East. 
 Overall,  Valley of the Wolves–Iraq presents good news and bad news. 
Th e good news is that James Bond and Rambo have a new friend – Polat 
Alemdar – in charting geopolitical representations. Th e bad news is that 
Alemdar charts and will continue to chart these representations at the expense 
of further solidifying the apparent self/other distinctions and the insecurity 
complex in Turkey, just as his friends Bond and Rambo have, so far, done in 
the West. 
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